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Recent developments have highlighted the tension between democracy and late capitalist 
economics. In the wake of the Great Recession, international market forces have increasingly 
taken de facto control of politics. My basic thesis is that a modified version of Jürgen Habermas’ 
colonization thesis, which opposes the takeover of social and political life by the forces of power 
(administration) and money (economics), productively conceptualizes these developments. I 
argue that this framework can help to both diagnose and combat the dangers associated with the 
overexpansion of functional systemic forces, as well as the broader instrumentalization that they 
promote. By drawing on his political writings on the future of the European Union after the crisis 
of the Eurozone, I oppose interpretations of Habermas as a pacified liberal by demonstrating that 
he shares Karl Marx’s commitment to combatting naturalized views of economics and material 
reproduction as a force that lie outside of human control.
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Introduction
Geopolitical events since the start of the twenty-first century have highlighted the grow-
ing tension between democratic decision-making and the systematic imperatives of late 
capitalism. In the aftermath of the Great Recession (2007–2012), economic interests have 
increasingly taken de facto control of politics, as global financial markets and institutions 
like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have demonstrated the ability to dictate pol-
icy to formally sovereign political communities. Faced with the prospect of rising interest 
rates and default on public debt, states around the world have been forced to liberalize 
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their economies, lower labor standards, bailout over-leveraged banks, and sell off public 
assets in order to placate global financial capital.
This has led to a “legitimation crisis” (Habermas, 1975) that has undermined the pre-
suppositions of the neo-liberal economic paradigm, which is based on the idea all areas of 
life should be organized using free market principles (Honneth, 2017; Sandel, 2013). 
Responding to these developments, I argue that a modified version of Jürgen Habermas’s 
thesis regarding the “colonization of the lifeworld” (Kolonialisierung der Lebenswelt) by 
the forces of power and money provides the necessary conceptual tools to theorize political 
resistance to market fundamentalism. Despite the gains in socio-economic steering-capac-
ity offered by administration (power) and markets (money), such “systemic” forces that 
operate with their own internal logics are increasingly able to override the discursive 
norms that form the basis of social, cultural, and political life. Habermas (1987 [1984]: 
II.283) therefore concludes that “the capitalist pattern of modernization is marked by a 
deformation, a reification of the symbolic structures of the lifeworld under the imperatives 
of subsystems differentiated out via money and power and rendered self-sufficient.”
In addition to these structural problems, Habermas observes that the occupation of 
other areas of life by these systems is problematic, as it encourages individuals to treat 
each other as means to predetermined ends, rather than as independent with actors with 
the ability to choose their own goals. The dominance of forms of thought that “bypass the 
conscious intentions of social agents entirely” thus lead individuals and institutionalized 
communities to “instrumentalize each other as a means for the success of their respective 
actions” (Cooke, 2006: 54). This insight allows Habermas to link his critique of function-
alist reason (funktionalistischen Vernunft) to Horkheimer and Adorno’s earlier critiques 
of the spread of instrumental rationality (Zweckrationalität) in the 1940s and 1950s.
When Habermas first developed the colonization thesis in the 1970s and 1980s, it was 
a response to the growing encroachment of the legal system into the lifeworld of intimacy 
and the family through the administrative welfare state, which he feared could end up 
constraining the emancipatory potential of new political movements. Although the func-
tional disempowerment of the Westphalian state since that time has allayed some of these 
domestic political concerns, Habermas’ insights have become more relevant in global 
affairs. By highlighting the potential of systemic forces to overwhelm the lifeworld 
(Lebenswelt) through processes of reification (Verdinglichung or Vergegenständlichung), 
in which social relations “take on the character of a thing” (Ding or Gegenstand), I argue 
that a revised version of colonization thesis can help to support the normative argument 
that international socio-cultural reproduction should be ruled collective political deci-
sion-making, not “autopoetic” systems operating with their own internal logics. Reflecting 
on the aftereffects of the Great Recession, which testify to the increasing colonization of 
the lifeworld by such forces, Habermas (2009: 186) therefore argues that the “whole pro-
gram of subordinating the lifeworld to the imperatives of the market must be subjected to 
scrutiny.”
Despite its diagnostic and explanatory utility, Habermas’s colonization thesis has also 
generated substantial pushback. For example, many commentators fear that his definition 
of power and money as “spheres organized exclusively on the basis of instrumental 
rationality” (Kreide, 2015: 46), “cedes too much territory to systems theory” (McCarthy, 
1991: 120). Still others worry that his approach comes “at the cost of relinquishing the 
ideal of a rational and transparent organization of social labor and material reproduction 
that is constitutive of the Marxist tradition” (Jütten, 2013: 588).
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Responding to these critiques, I back Rahel Jaeggi’s (2019: 37) contention that the 
colonization thesis presented in the “Theory of Communicative Action is one of the few 
conceptualizations that even attempts to defend the project of a social-theoretic critique 
of society” by applying it to the increasingly asymmetric relationship between politics 
and economics. While it is true that he often refers to the systemic forces of power and 
money in ways that sound essentialist, I push back against what I see as misguided “ter-
ritorial readings” of Habermas by arguing that this bifurcation should be understood as a 
distinction between two fundamentally different orientations or dispositions that shape 
the expectations of individuals in different areas of life. These concepts thus operate as 
heuristic shortcuts that highlight the incentive structures that typically operate in these 
domains, not as rigid classifications of fully separate or autonomous domains.
In addition to this interpretive work, my argument also reconsiders Habermas’ rela-
tionship to Karl Marx in light of the growing “threat to democracy of unchecked corpo-
rate power” (Staats, 2004). In contrast to interpretations that claim that Habermas “in 
effect removes the economic sphere from the realm of criticism” (Fraser and Jaeggi, 
2018: 5), I argue that what I call Habermas’s “chastened Marxism” allows him to high-
light the dangers associated with the unreflective acceptance of market-based solutions as 
functionally or instrumentally necessary, while at the same time also acknowledging the 
advantages of markets insofar as their operation is effectively constrained by limits put in 
place through the operation of the lifeworld. In making this point, I reinterpret the colo-
nization thesis as Habermas’s attempt “to reach the goals intrinsic to Marx’s thought 
through a paradigm shift . . . intended to do what historical materialism meant, but was 
unable to accomplish” (Rockmore, 1987: 212).
Methodologically, I not only draw on Habermas’s philosophical research, but also on 
his understudied political interventions, where he seeks to put his abstract ideas into prac-
tice “as an engaged public intellectual in the very same ‘political public sphere’ that he 
theorized as a philosopher” (Pensky, 2013: 31). I thus push back against what I see as 
overly narrow readings of Habermas that confine his social and political theory to the 
“interaction between democratic publics and economic structures to communication 
through the legal medium” (Klein, 2020: 19–20). By focusing on the “philosopher as 
engaged citizen” (Verovšek, 2021), I argue that Habermas performatively demonstrates 
the crucial role that non-legal forms of communication that emerge from within the public 
sphere—including naming and shaming, legal regulation in response to popular demands, 
worker activism as well as shareholder pressure—have to play in reigning in the power of 
economic institutions and global markets.
Finally, my attention to his “short political writings” (Kleine politische Schriften) 
seeks to redeem Habermas’ (1992a: 469) view of himself as “the last Marxist.” Despite 
the differences in historical context—as well some fundamental philosophical disagree-
ments—I demonstrate that both Marx and Habermas oppose the economic thinking of 
their time by arguing out that “the questions at stake aren’t just technical; they are moral 
and political” (Robin, 2019). In the mid-nineteenth century, Marx deployed his social 
theory against physiocrats and laissez-faire classical liberal economists, who equated 
economic regularities with natural laws that could be understood and accepted by science, 
but not changed, challenged, or opposed (Gehrke and Kurz, 1995).
Similarly, over the course of his career, Habermas has devoted many of his public 
interventions to opposing the market fundamentalism of the Freiburg and Bocconi 
Schools (Dullien and Guérot, 2012: 2). Much like the physiocrats and laissez-faire clas-
sical liberal economists, thinkers associated with these twentieth-century traditions also 
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“oppose intervention into the normal course of the economy” and inculcate a “deep dis-
trust of the state” (Blyth, 2013: 167) by presenting economic regularities as natural laws. 
By pushing back against such economic ideologies, Habermas not only reveals certain 
affinities between his philosophy and that of Marx; his frequent participation in public 
debates also refutes the accusation that he “abandons the aim at fundamental social 
change” (Rockmore, 1989: 166).
The argument proceeds as follows. I start by briefly outlining why Habermas can be 
considered a Marxist despite his many disagreements and departures from Marx. The sec-
ond section then describes Habermas’s mediation of system and lifeworld. Using his polit-
ical writings, I then show how he uses the Great Recession and the crisis of the Eurozone 
to argue that politics needs to develop at the supranational level in order to push back 
against international financialized capitalism. In the final section, I argue that Habermas’s 
desire to fight alienation (Entfremdung) by combatting the domination of human life by the 
external, “quasi-natural” forces of the market validates his view of himself as a Marxist.
Thinking with Marx against Marx
The contention that Habermas is a Marxist may seem strange given his many disagree-
ments with key aspects of Marx’s philosophy and his repeated criticisms of the Marxist 
tradition. For example, speaking of his relationship to Marxism Habermas admits, “I was 
never convinced by the centrepiece of political economy, the theory of surplus value, in 
view of the intervention of the welfare state in the economy” (in Foessel, 2015). By argu-
ing that bureaucratic management and untethered markets distort the structures of inter-
subjectivity, he separates the basic pathologies of late capitalism from the issue of class, 
locating these problems at the systemic level of distorted communication and the life-
world instead.
Although he (Habermas, 1970: 101) argues that “a critical theory of society can no 
longer be constituted in the exclusive form of a critique of political economy,” my attempt 
to redeem Habermas self-image of himself as a Marxist builds on the theoretical orienta-
tion that he has retained from this tradition. This legacy is particularly visible in the fact 
that Habermas focuses his diagnosis of the problems of contemporary society on the 
broader social, political, and cultural effects of “an economic system that regulates itself 
by obeying exclusively the logic of a profit-orientated self-utilization of capital,” which 
Marx identified as “the real engine of societal modernization” (quoted in Foessel, 2015). 
Although Habermas is more accepting of markets than Marx, this is true of many non-
orthodox Marxist critics of capital as well. For example, despite his disagreements with 
Habermas, Axel Honneth (2017: 47) has also called on contemporary socialist move-
ments to overcome their “self-imposed theoretical handicap” by opening themselves up 
to greater experimentation with regulated forms of market-based exchange, as the tradi-
tional Marxist conviction that “the market could only be replaced by a planned economy 
. . . [has] left no room for institutional mediation or a reassessment of priorities.”
From this perspective, Habermas’s departure from a narrow focus on political econ-
omy does not signal a move away from Marx, but rather is a response to the fact that over 
the past century “the object of critique itself necessitated the transcendence of the critique 
of political economy in the form of the critique of technoscientific social hegemony” 
(Dorahy, 2020: 2). While Habermas is not an orthodox Marxist, his social and political 
theory still fits within this broader tradition, in the same way that other adherents of criti-
cal, revisionist, humanist, Hegelian, or Western Marxism are part of this movement. 
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Habermas (1992b: 81) makes this point by noting that what drew him to the work of 
Horkheimer and Adorno in the 1950s was that
they weren’t engaged in a reception of Marx . . . they were utilizing him. [. . .] [T]hey were 
working out a theory of the dialectical development of present-day society, and in doing so they 
were proceeding from a tradition of Marxist thought.
As I show in the next section, Habermas shares this basic orientation to both Marx with 
his predecessors in the first generation of the Frankfurt School.
Lifeworld and System in Habermas
Habermas’s colonization thesis is deeply indebted to György Lukács’ combination of 
Marx’s analysis of commodification and Max Weber’s theory of rationalization. Following 
Marx, Lukács argues that capitalism forces individuals to see their labor power (Arbeitskraft) 
in a commodified manner, that is, as an object to be bought and sold on the market. As a 
result, material reproduction becomes a separate subsystem of life which the “process of 
production has the mastery over man, instead of being controlled by him” (Marx, 1978: 
321). Lukács supplements this Marxist conclusion with Weber’s insight that in modernity 
such systems have been subjected to “the methodological rationalization of life,” which 
leads to the “discharge of business according to calculable rules and ‘without regard for 
persons’” (Weber, 1985: 128). Fusing these two perspectives, Lukács (1972: 86) argues that 
individuals living in modern, capitalist, industrialized societies increasingly come to experi-
ence power and money as part of a reified (thing-like or “object”-ive) “second nature.”
While Habermas (1987 [1984]: I.357) endorses the basic thrust of Lukács’ analysis 
and his desire for “rational life relations,” he argues that his predecessor’s desire to 
reunify these differing aspects of life goes too far. Instead, following Weber, he contends 
that the rationalization of the spheres of money and power is irrevocable as a historical 
development. In this way, Habermas (1991b: 37) takes advantage of this “fertile combi-
nation of Marx and Max Weber.”
In addition to the irreversibility of the separation of these spheres of life, Habermas 
also claims that reincorporating money and power into the lifeworld is undesirable, as the 
functional separation of these systems has led to unprecedented advances in economic 
well-being. Given the increasing complexity of modern society, he argues that is unclear 
whether the mechanisms of the lifeworld are even still capable of organizing material 
reproduction. Rather than calling for a return to a precapitalist past (as Lukács does), 
Habermas (1987 [1984]: II.181) instead contends that power and money act as a “relief 
mechanism” that allow the lifeworld to focus on symbolic and cultural reproduction.
In order to work out how this relationship should work, in the Theory of Communicative 
Action, Habermas (1987 [1984]: I.363) “take[s] up the problematic of reification again.” 
However, this time, he reformulates, “it in terms of communicative action, on the one 
hand, and of the formations of subsystems via steering media, on the other” (Habermas 
1987 [1984]: I.399). He thus builds on the advantages in efficiency and productivity 
resulting from the functional separation of power and money from other areas of life, 
while also ensuring that these systems serve human needs and interests.
Habermas develops these ideas in his debate with Niklas Luhmann. In contrast to 
Habermas’s desire to preserve discursive control over the forms of technical or instru-
mental rationality (Zweckrationalität), Luhmann (1990: 3) argues that such “autopoetic” 
6 Political Studies 00(0)
(self-perpetuating) systems not only “produce and change their own structures,” but are 
also closed to interference by social agents due to the fact that “everything that is used as 
a unit by the system is produced by the system itself.” Although they do not “create a 
world of their own” externally, he contends that each system “operat[es] within a world 
of its own” internally.
Summarizing his argument, Luhmann (1982: 78) insists,
The basic reality of society can no longer be said to lie in its capacity to generate and sustain 
interaction system. [. . .] In view of this, moralistic demands for more “personal participation” 
in social processes are hopelessly out of touch with social reality.
By contrast, Habermas (in Habermas and Henrich, 1974: 60) notes that if Luhmann is 
right, then
individuals henceforth belong only to the environment of their social systems. In relation to 
them society takes on an objectivity that can no longer be brought into the intersubjective 
context of life, for it is no longer related to subjectivity.
Given that this situation represents an untenable “dehumanization of society,” Habermas 
seeks to separate the lifeworld from the operation of functional systems, as well as from 
the ideology of instrumentalization to which it is linked.
Just as he resists Lukács’ call for a total rejection of the functional separation of power 
and money, Habermas also pushes back against Luhmann’s attempt to integrate systems 
theory into all areas of life. Thomas McCarthy (1985: 28) notes that Habermas’s “strategy 
is to enter into a pact of sorts with social systems theory: certain areas are marked out 
within which it may move about quite freely, on the condition that it keep entirely away 
from others.” Unlike Luhmann, Habermas argues that human control governed by discur-
sive agreement must preserve both the right and the ability to subject such systems to 
regulation when they produce undesirable outcomes and/or colonize areas of life which 
debates in the lifeworld have determined should not be open to systemic control. The key 
point is that the mechanisms of opinion- and will-formation in the lifeworld retain the 
ability to not only regulate the autonomous systems of power and money, but also to 
determine the scope and reach of these systems.
This desire to empower social groups to communicatively determine the role of sys-
temic forces in their collective life is at the heart of his analysis of colonization, as well 
as his rejection of technocracy. For Habermas, the democratic resources of the lifeworld 
are the key to regulating both power and money:
We are faced with the problem of how capabilities for self-organization can be developed to 
such an extent within autonomous public spheres that radical democratic process of will-
formation can come to have a decisive impact on the regulatory mechanisms and marginal 
conditions of media-steered subsystems in a lifeworld oriented toward use values, toward ends 
in general. This task involves holding the systemic imperatives of an interventionist state 
apparatus and those of an economic system in check, and is formulated in defensive terms. Yet, 
this defensive resteering will not be able to succeed without a radical and broadly effective 
democratization (Habermas, 1991a: 261).
The basic contours of Habermas’s reply to Luhmann, as well as his desire to construct 
a “‘two-level concept of society’ that integrates the lifeworld and system paradigms” 
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(McCarthy, 1985: 27) is crucial to understanding his views on the proper place of markets 
in modern democratic life.1
A number of commentators worry about the implications of Habermas’s (1987 [1984]: 
II.150) claim that “the market is the most important example of a norm-free regulation of 
cooperative contexts.” At first blush, this statement does indeed seem to deny that eco-
nomic interactions can be regulated by the lifeworld. As a result, Habermas (1991a: 256) 
has subsequently admitted that this phrase “has led to misunderstandings.”
While it may have been badly put, such as reading is also misinterpretation. As Timo 
Jütten (2013: 589) points out, “When Habermas characterizes a sphere of social action as 
norm-free, the intended contrast is with spheres of social action whose integration is gov-
erned by the norms of communicative action oriented towards mutual understanding.” 
Habermas’s assertion that the market operates as a form of “norm-free sociality” is merely 
meant to emphasize the fact that the unregulated market is a systemic force with its own 
inner logic, which operates autopoetically without regard for the cooperative norms of 
communicative action that govern the uncolonized lifeworld.
Building on this point, I argue that it is best to think of Habermas’s treatment of the 
system—and his placement of power and money into this category—in terms of Weberian 
ideal types (Idealtypi). His argument is not that economic and administrative interactions 
are never mediated in communicative ways; it is merely that these spheres of life tend to 
be governed by instrumental or strategic considerations. In a reply to his critics, Habermas 
(1991a: 257) thus notes that “my thesis amounts merely to the assertion that the integra-
tion of these action systems is in the final instance not based on the potential for social 
integration of communicative actions and the lifeworld background thereof.” From 
Habermas’ perspective, the distinctive feature of the system is its functionalist character. 
While this incentivizes individuals to act in strategic ways, it does not rule out communi-
cative interactions. It does, however, mean that when operating within these functional 
spheres of life individuals can “act communicatively only with reservation . . . [as] there 
is no necessity for achieving consensus by communicative means” (Habermas, 1987 
[1984]: II.310–311).
Up to this point, my discussion has proceeded theoretically. While important, this per-
spective says little about how these insights can be applied in practice. Fortunately, 
Habermas has also produced a large number of political writings in which he seeks to 
apply his theoretical insights to real world developments. In order to reach their potential, 
he (Habermas, 1996: 302) argues that the principles of abstract political order have to 
meet events “halfway” (Entgegenkommen; see Verovšek, 2012). Since 2008, Habermas 
has devoted the vast majority of these political writings to the Great Recession and its 
effects within the EU, thus performatively refuting the idea that his philosophy has noth-
ing to say about actual political developments (see Verovšek, 2021). In addressing these 
pathologies, Habermas (2009: 186) concludes, “My hope is that the neoliberal agenda 
will no longer be accepted at face value.”
Fighting Colonization at the Supranational Level
In response to Great Recession of 2008, Habermas devoted much of his energy to oppos-
ing technocratic solutions to the financial crisis that engulfed the member-states of the EU 
that share its common currency, the euro. Although the contagion started as a subprime 
mortgage crisis that threatened the balance sheets of the American banking sector, it soon 
migrated across the Atlantic. European banks, particularly those in the rich member-states 
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of northern Europe that had invested heavily in the repackaged debt instruments created 
in the US, were forced to confront the prospect of default. This, in turn, threatened busi-
ness in the poorer member-states of the EU’s south and east. Since they were unable to 
unilaterally devaluate a currency, they shared with the other members of the Eurozone, 
they faced higher interest rates on existing debt in the middle of the greatest economic 
crisis since the Great Depression (this analysis builds on Verovšek, 2017).
In order to deal with these problems, governments across the EU—particularly those 
with over-leveraged financial sectors—were forced to rescue their banks with increased 
public borrowing in order to prevent a collapse of their financial sectors. This policy 
response was dictated by the ordo- and neo-liberal views of the German Freiburg and 
Italian Bocconi Schools, whose respective adherents come together to dominate both the 
IMF and the European Central Bank (ECB). These economic ideologies are both based 
on a deep-seated insistence “on the rationality of leaving market mechanisms to their own 
devices” (Habermas quoted in Foessel, 2015) and an abiding “distrust of the state and its 
management of public debt” (Blyth, 2013: 167).
However, while these policy responses are logical from within the parameters of these 
ideological paradigms, the translation of private borrowing into sovereign debt effec-
tively impoverished the population of Europe, as member-states were forced to respond 
by cutting public services in order to retain the confidence of global markets. These 
developments demonstrate how the operation of semi-autonomous, autopoetic systems 
can run off the rails when they are not subjected to sufficient political regulation, in which 
formal institutions of will-formation respond to the steering mechanisms of opinion-for-
mation within the lifeworld. As a result, the need “to tame [markets] has re-emerged as a 
moral and political question with new urgency” (Jütten, 2013: 588).
Despite popular demands for the fundamental reform of banking and finance, the EU 
was unable to intervene due to the ideological constraints imposed by ordo- and neo-lib-
eral thinking. In fact, the most decisive instances of crisis management came from tech-
nocratic actors operating in Luhmannian ways. Thus, while agents within what John 
Kenneth Galbraith (2007) called the “technostructure” were able to push on the internal 
levers of the European currency system—the decision by Mario Draghi, the President of 
the ECB, to expand the monetary base of the Eurozone by purchasing bad debt and plac-
ing it on the balance sheets of the ECB is a good example of this phenomenon—govern-
ments across the Eurozone “had made no policy and the finance ministers had made no 
decisions” (Galbraith, 2016: 99). Regina Kreide (2015: 42) points out that when “politics 
is reduced to technical planning” in this way, “Governance becomes a willful tool for 
market-conforming regulation and, by this, a substitute for democracy.”
While this approach is due in part to disagreements between European leaders regard-
ing the EU’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), it also reflects the ordo- and neo-
liberal conviction that political interference in the operation of the complex economic 
system should be kept to a minimum. These economic theories, which define the basic 
architecture of the EMU, hold that “markets always operate smoothly” and interpret 
attempts at political interference “as undermining the principle of monetary stability and 
creating a moral hazard” (Dullien and Guérot, 2012: 3, 2). Although this laissez-faire 
approach presents itself as neutral, it is driven by a class structure that favors the member-
states of Europe’s north and west, as well as the wealthy citizens therein, who supposedly 
took risks in lending to the poorer citizens and member-states of the south and east. Far 
from being purely technocratic, this support for austerity is actually the results of “an odd 
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mixture of political positions and ideological priors” (Blyth, 2013: 59) that favor the 
interests of lenders over debtors.
Habermas’s recent political writings build on his diagnosis of the situation at the start 
of the twenty-first century. In his interventions in the emerging transnational European 
public sphere, he has called on the peoples of Europe to encourage their political repre-
sentatives to support the greater regulation of markets as a way to push back against the 
colonization of the lifeworld. I use Habermas’s political writings on the future of Europe 
(many of which have been collected in Habermas, 2009, 2012, see Verovšek, 2012) to 
make the following two important points: (1) his work as a public intellectual reveals a 
deep and abiding concern with capitalism and its effects on the everyday lives of indi-
viduals and (2) his political engagement serves as evidence that he believes collective 
democratic action, informed through public intellectual activity, can assert control over 
systemic forces.
In line with his rejection of the strict separation of systemic forces from social and 
political intrusion, Habermas also insists on the necessity of subjecting the forces of the 
market to political regulation generated by discursive opinion- and will-formation. In 
contrast to ordo- and neo-liberal economists, who contend that the crisis will resolve 
itself through the internal operation of the economic system, Habermas’ (2001: 84) basic 
thesis is that “politics has to catch up with globalized markets, and has to do so in insti-
tutional forms that do not regress below the legitimacy conditions for democratic self-
determination.” Colonization in the current globalized geoeconomic context, therefore, 
occurs when the mismatch between the powerful systemic forces of international mar-
kets and the relatively weak development of global political institutions, which can 
defend the lifeworlds of individuals in an increasingly globalized multicultural world, 
becomes too great.
The crisis of the Eurozone has only increased Habermas’ fears about the colonization 
of politics by economics. Writing in the influential German weekly Die Zeit, he (Habermas, 
2010) argues the necessity of political bailouts for the economic system constitutes a 
“paradigm shift” that “changes the foundational principles of the European Union.” The 
basic problem is that the EU’s economic integration through the Common Market (CM) 
has not been matched by the creation of political institutions of will-formation capable of 
overseeing one of the world’s most industrialized and developed regions. Although the 
EU was supposed to make up for the inability of the nation-state to regulate economic 
relations in an increasingly globalized world, Habermas (2006: 84) notes, “Today, the 
European Union constitutes a broad continental region which is spanned by a dense net-
work of markets in the horizontal dimension, but is subject to relatively weak political 
regulation by indirectly legitimated authorities in the vertical dimension.”
More specifically, he points out that the need for bailouts is proof that the ordo-liberal 
ideology of non-interference is bunk, since the development of the crisis shows that mar-
kets cannot function without taxpayer support and public bailouts. The Great Recession, 
therefore, presents an opportunity to deepen political integration, since it proves that 
more political control of the economy is necessary to maintain the economic system as it 
stands. In addition, given that individual states found themselves unable to respond to the 
financial crisis—which was driven in part by a regulatory race to the bottom—these 
events demonstrate the need for supranational political control of economic, financial, 
and banking policy. In a public essay on the “crisis of the European Union,” Habermas 
(2012: 10) argues that
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it is only through such new transnational steering capabilities that the social forces of nature that 
have been unleashed at the transnational level—i.e. the systemic constraints that operate without 
hindrance across national borders, today especially those of the global banking sector—can also 
be tamed.
Habermas’s (2013b: 378) analysis of the necessity of protecting against the coloniza-
tion of the lifeworld at the supranational level builds on the realization “that the era of 
nation-states is coming to an end and that the creation of institutions of a global domestic 
policy must be opened up for discussion.” Although states have indeed lost a significant 
amount of their steering-capacity vis-à-vis global markets in recent decades, this conclu-
sion is hardly uncontroversial. In fact, the onset of the Great Recession has actually led a 
number of thinkers—particularly on the political left—to argue that subjecting global 
market forces to political control requires a withdrawal from international institutions and 
a return to a more Westphalian form of state sovereignty.
One of the most visible public intellectual arguing for such a “return to the nation-
state” is Wolfgang Streeck. His analysis builds on the lessons of the Wirtschaftswunder 
(“economic miracle”) or trente glourieuses (“glorious thirty”), which represents the hey-
day of the welfare state and the political taming of markets. A historical analysis of the 
period from 1945 to 1975 leads Streeck (2014) to conclude that monetary policy must be 
given back to the nation-states that enabled Europe’s postwar prosperity in the first 
place, since the sovereign state was the only institution in history that has succeeded in 
regulating markets. While both Streeck (2013) and Habermas (2013a) share a common 
diagnosis of the problems of the Eurozone, they disagree about whether the pathologies 
revealed in the course of the Great Recession and the crisis of the Eurozone require pull-
ing back or pushing forward with further integration (for more on this debate, see 
Shoikhedbrod, 2021).
In contrast to Habermas, Streeck argues that it is possible to return to the policies that 
created the postwar economic boom, where the nation-state was able to use its sovereign 
powers to influence global market forces. Although Habermas recognizes the coherence 
of this position, he argues that Streeck’s argument is based on assumptions that are no 
longer valid. Developments since the end of the Cold War show that the power of the state 
to control events within its borders—a key component of the traditional doctrine of sov-
ereignty—is in decline, especially as regards the regulation of economic activity. As 
Matti Koskenniemi (2011: 63) points out, “The pattern of influence and decision-making 
that rules the world has an increasingly marginal connection with sovereignty.” This is 
particularly true in Europe, where the creation of the EU as a supranational entity with 
independent decision-making powers has rendered “the nation-state hollow and its insti-
tutions meaningless” (Weiler, 1999: 98).
Habermas’s argument about the necessity of fighting the “colonization of the life-
world” by moving toward what he calls a “postnational constellation” is also supported 
by evidence showing that the EU’s efforts to tame the global economic forces at the 
supranational level have succeeded, at least in part. This is visible in the emergence of 
two differing models of globalization in the post-Cold War world. The American path is 
driven by bilateral agreements, limited planning, and the idea that the power of multi-
national corporations and other economic interests should predominate. This ad hoc 
approach to globalization ignores “the need to legitimate the processes of cross-border 
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market integration” and brings about “liberalization without organizing or even supervis-
ing, markets” (Abdelal and Meunier, 2010: 350–351).
While the US has used its hegemonic position in global politics to support its vision of 
globalization based on laissez-faire, market liberalization, Europe has developed an alter-
native approach of “managed globalization.” This second track shares the goal of market 
liberalization, but seeks to embed economic policy within multi-lateral agreements that 
allow for social planning by managers, politicians, and bureaucrats based on codified rules 
as well as an awareness of the economic consequences of market liberalization:
In contrast to the American neoliberal theories that profits are ultimately good for everyone 
because prosperity will trickle down, the European approach is rooted in a more egalitarian 
theory of justice . . . [that] make it compatible with a more just social democratic model of 
society (Reich and Lebow, 2014: 61, 64).
The European model of managed globalization is neither perfect nor uncontested. On 
the contrary, this predominantly French approach is strongly opposed by ordo- and neo-
liberal economists based Germany and Italy. In practice, the events of the Great Recession 
demonstrate that when push comes to shove, the latter tend to win out over the former, as 
dirigiste management was not allowed to regulate the systemic forces operating within 
the Eurozone, but instead had to bow to the supposedly neutral power of the market. 
However, there is some hope that the former can be developed further by allowing supra-
national political actors like the EU to oversee international markets.
To date, the European model of managed globalization has operated primarily through 
top-down agenda-setting within international organizations and bottom-up initiatives 
delineating acceptable corporate behavior (Reich and Lebow, 2014: 63). However, even 
if the French model of managed globalization does win this ideational battle, the basic 
problem is that the EU’s market integration has not been matched by a similar degree of 
political integration, as the EMU was established under the influence of the laissez-faire 
ideology of the Bocconi and Freiburg Schools. This victory is a historical artifact, as the 
creation of an apolitical, non-interventionist central bank with the sole mandate of main-
taining the stability of prices by fighting inflation on the model of the German Central 
Bank (the Bundesbank) was the price the French had to pay to convince the Federal 
Republic to give up the D-Mark (Van Middelaar, 2013: 183–192; Verovšek, 2014: 241, 
245, 2020: 93–94). However, in the wake of the Great Recession, it has become clear that 
this model does not work when applied to the diverse economies of the Eurozone.
Despite his German background, Habermas breaks with Teutonic economic orthodoxy 
by arguing that the time has come for politics to stop “holding its breath and dodging the 
key issues at the threshold leading from the economic to the political unification of 
Europe.” He (Habermas, 2012: 7, 10) notes that
it is only through such new transnational steering capabilities that the social forces of nature that 
have been unleashed at the transnational level—i.e. the systemic constraints that operate without 
hindrance across national borders, today especially those of the global banking sector—can also 
be tamed.
It is this call for the renewed empowerment of the social and political forces of the life-
world to be deployed against the seemingly natural “laws” governing the operation of 
global economics and international markets that testifies to Habermas’s residual Marxism.
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Habermas as the “Last Marxist”
Although he is associated with the Western Marxism of the Frankfurt School, Habermas 
has a complex relationship to Marx. While he admires Marx’s analysis of the alienation 
that accompanies the commodification of labor power under capitalism, Habermas rejects 
Marx’s materialistic analytical framework and his revolutionary calls for a “dictatorship 
of the proletariat.” Following Weber, he is also deeply skeptical of Marx’s desire to 
reunify the different value spheres that have separated over the course of the last 200 years, 
as he sees this development an irrevocable aspect of modernization that has important 
benefits in terms of societal efficiency and material reproduction.
I cannot provide a full accounting of Marxist interpretation or of Habermas’s relation-
ship to Marx.2 My goal is more modest. Although his claim to be “the last Marxist” is 
overstated, I argue that Habermas is a Marxist in the sense that he also seeks to ensure that 
the process of production serves human needs, not vice versa. More precisely, I highlight 
how both Marx and Habermas oppose economic theories that interpret the operation of 
markets as subject to quasi-natural laws that cannot or should not be subject to outside 
interference. In addition, they also seek to fulfill what Habermas refers to as philosophy’s 
commitment “to advocacy” (Holton, 1987: 516)—that is, to “changing the world” as 
Marx famously puts it in his 11th thesis on Feuerbach—by encouraging political com-
munities to take active control over market forces.
This interpretation of the core of Marx’s project comes from his immanent critique of 
classical economics, where he opposes the laissez-faire views of the English classical 
economics and the French physiocrats (Gehrke and Kurz, 1995). Perhaps the most famous 
example of the former is Adam Smith. Although it is true, as John Maynard Keynes 
(2004: 24) points out, that Smith and the other English classical economists never use the 
term laissez-faire, Smith’s belief in the idea that “the private interests and passions of 
men” produce that “which is most agreeable to the interest of the whole of society,” cer-
tainly implies that most government “regulations may, no doubt, be considered a viola-
tion of natural liberty” (Smith quoted in Naggar, 1977: 35, 36). Thus, while Smith “was 
not a doctrinaire advocate of laissez faire” (Viner, 1927: 231), his understanding of self-
ishness and of the “happy consequences” (Smith, 1976: IV.ix) of natural liberty both 
incline Smith toward a minimalist doctrine of state power. Even in cases where he con-
cludes that the government must intervene to ensure the defense of the realm and the 
provision of certain limited public goods, Smith brings the state back in reluctantly, argu-
ing that this should be accomplished with minimal taxation so as not to disrupt the eco-
nomic system of natural liberty.
While Smith’s views regarding the benefits of government non-intervention are part 
of the canon of political economy, the theories of the économiste, such as A.R.J. Turgot, 
the Marquis de Condorcet, Francois Quesnay, and Louis Paul Abeille, are somewhat 
more obscure despite their stature at the time when Marx was writing in the nineteenth 
century. Much like Smith, these thinkers also sought to understand the origins of the 
wealth of nations. However, in contrast to Smith’s focus on the division of labor, Marx 
(1978: 240) notes that the physiocrats posit “a certain kind of labour—agriculture—as 
the creator of wealth.”
Despite this divergence, it is the commonalities between these strands of thought that 
are important for Marx. In particular, like Smith, the physiocrats also argue that a “natural 
order” of unchanging laws governs economic processes. For example, Quesnay, who was 
trained as a physician, sought to apply the principles of the physical science of medicine 
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to the study of economic wealth. His famous Tableau économique (Quesnay, 1758) laid 
the foundation for his opposition to government intervention based on the argument that 
such interference is deleterious and counterproductive in the long run. Much like Smith’s 
(1776) Wealth of Nations, “Physiocrat economics was premised on laissez-faire, and 
advocated a free labour market against the mercantilism of Colbert and the feudal world 
of the guilds on which it was grafted” (Van der Pijl, 2002: 133).
Perhaps the most (in)famous example of this argument against government action in 
the economy comes from Abeille. Writing about the grain trade in the eighteenth century, 
he argues that government intervention to lower grain prices during a famine so that the 
people could afford to buy it was self-defeating, as subsidizing prices would incentivize 
farmers to produce less grain while also lowering their profits. Since they would have less 
money to invest the following year, production would be even lower. The end result, 
according to Abeille, is that government intervention becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, 
which only makes the famine worse by disrupting the efficient working of the market (see 
Foucault, 2009: 43–45). This explains why Jacob Viner (1960: 45) classifies the physio-
crats and Smith as “the pioneer systematic exponents of [laissez-faire]” and “the limita-
tion of government activity.”
In his critiques of political economy, Marx opposes such naturalized views of eco-
nomic laws. He argues that the economy, while subject to certain internal analytic regu-
larities, is still a human creation that can and should be subjected to social control. Marx 
(1978: 321), therefore, contends that classical economic theory “belong[s] to a state of 
society, in which the process of production has the mastery over man, instead of being 
controlled by him.” He argues that the real issue is ideological, as economic orthodoxy 
leads individuals living under capitalism come to see economic laws as immutable. In 
Marx’s (1978: 327) words, the fundamental problem is that “such formulae appear to the 
bourgeois intellect to be as much a self-evident necessity imposed by Nature as produc-
tive labour itself.” The fetishization of laissez-faire economic laws as the equivalent of 
the physical laws discovered by the natural sciences hides the fact that they are actually 
the products of social relations, which are therefore subject to change by definition.
The thinkers of the early Frankfurt School were quick to pick up on this connection. In 
his review of the “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts” after they were published in 
full for the first time in 1932, Herbert Marcuse (1972: 12) identifies “the breakthrough 
from economic fact to human factors, from fact (Tat‘sache’) to act (Tat‘handlung’)” as 
“one of the crucial discoveries of Marx’s theory” which is of “revolutionary significance.” 
The key move is from “the comprehension of fixed ‘situations’ and their laws (which in 
their reified form are out of man’s power)” to the idea that as social beings, individuals 
have the ability to exercise control over the operation of the economic system. Glossing 
Marx, Marcuse (1972: 36) concludes:
If the relations of production have become a “fetter” and an alien force determining man, then 
this is only because man has at some stage himself alienated himself from his power over the 
relations of production. This is also true if one sees the relations of production as being 
determined primarily by the given “natural” forces of production (e.g. climatic or geographical 
conditions, the condition of the land, the distribution of raw materials) and ignores the fact that 
all these physical data have always existed in a form historically handed down and have formed 
a part of particular human and social “forms of intercourse.”
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For Habermas’s teachers in the first generation of the Frankfurt School, the realization 
that economic laws are not natural and immutable, but are instead social and controllable 
is the core of Marx’s (1978: 84, 121) “fully-developed,” “positive,” or “real” humanism 
(Marcuse, 1972: 40). As an heir to this legacy, Habermas argues that exercising control 
over the economy through political regulation is the essence of socialism, particularly 
after the fall of communism in 1989. Marx’s key insight is that any civilization that 
“blinds itself to anything, however important, that cannot be expressed as a price . . . 
bears the seeds of its own destruction” (Habermas, 1991b: 32). The embodiment of this 
danger in the contemporary world of late capitalism is no longer “a class that rules within 
national limits [as in Marx’s day], but rather an anonymous, internationally operating 
economic system.”
The essence of Habermas’s “chastened Marxism” is thus to be found in his rejection 
of economic theories that treat markets as the embodiment of quasi-natural laws. His 
(Habermas, 1991b: 42) goal is to ensure that politics is “in a position to stake its claim 
against other social forces, money and administrative power, through a wide range of 
democratic forums and institutions.” Although he recognizes that interventions within 
such functional subsystems of material reproduction may have unforeseen conse-
quences, he does not believe that regulation is illegitimate as such. He therefore seeks 
to take advantage of the gains in efficiency and well-being brought about by the devel-
opment of capitalism, while also ensuring that the lifeworld can push back against colo-
nization by systemic forces by regulating the areas of life in which their operation is 
allowed to take hold.
This represents a radical departure from Marx, who foresaw the end of the market, the 
dissolution of private property ownership and of formally “free labor,” which is often 
unfree in practice (see Rioux et al., 2020). While Habermas (1991b: 37) is sympathetic to 
these goals, he is skeptical of such “nostalgic images of the types of community—the 
family, the neighbourhood and the guild—to be found in the world of peasants and crafts-
men.” He argues instead is that historical developments since the nineteenth century show 
that “complex societies are unable to reproduce themselves if they do not leave the logic 
of an economy that regulates itself through the market intact.” Given the conditions of 
late financialized capitalism, the goal is not to abandon or supersede the market, but to 
“switch from a market-led to a democratically controlled production process” (Habermas, 
1991b: 40) that can take advantage of economic mechanisms while regulating their scope 
and reach in order to prevent the colonization of the lifeworld (see Honneth, 2017).
In addition to Habermas’s acceptance of a role for the market and the systems of power 
and money, there are also other important differences between him and Marx. For exam-
ple, in addition to some of the points I mentioned in the first section, Habermas does not 
believe that politics can be overcome within a communist order that rejects markets and 
the constitutional legal order of the Rechtsstaat completely. He (Habermas, 1991b: 34, 
35), therefore, critiques Marx for his “restricted and functionalist analysis of constitu-
tional democracy,” which “is unable to imagine institutional forms beyond the dictator-
ship of the proletariat.” By contrast, Habermas argues that political institutions will 
always be necessary to translate communicative opinion-formation in the public sphere 
into legitimate will-formation in the form of law.
My interpretation of the key tenets of Habermas’ socialism—which builds on eco-
nomic and historical developments since Marx’s death, as well as on the insights of post-
Marxist theory, especially the work of Lukács, Weber, and Luhmann—sets up an 
interesting parallel between Marx and Habermas in terms of their interventions in the 
Verovšek 15
public sphere and their shared philosophical commitment to political activism. This simi-
larity has to do with their positioning within the predominant debates over political econ-
omy in their respective historical moments. Whereas Marx resisted the physiocrats in 
arguing that markets were not natural and should be subjected to social control, Habermas 
opposes the ordo-liberals of the Freiburg and Bocconi Schools by arguing that markets 
both can and should be more heavily regulated to ensure that they serve the citizens of 
Europe, not the other way around.
Although there are many differences between the Freiburg and Bocconi Schools com-
pared to the physiocrats and the classical liberal economists of the nineteenth century, 
there are some telling parallels as well. Most important for my purposes is their shared 
opposition to government intervention in markets and the ideological function of this 
position in favoring the class interests of the rich money-lenders compared to poorer bor-
rowers of capital. Thus, just as Abeille argued against grain subsidies to support the poor 
even though it meant that they might die, so the ordo- and neo-liberals of the Freiburg and 
Bocconi Schools have forced governments in the crisis-ridden European south to inter-
vene less in the economy during the course of the Great Recession and the crisis of the 
Eurozone, despite the tragic human consequences this has had on individuals living in 
Greece and the other crisis-ridden Eurozone members from eastern and southern Europe.
Similarly, much as Marx opposed the laissez-faire theories of the physiocrats apathy 
toward the plight of individuals living within the economic system, so Habermas opposes 
the non-interventionist stance of ordo-liberalism. Instead, he (Habermas, 2014: 12) calls 
on Europeans to “push for further political integration in order to extend their control over 
quasi-natural economic forces [to] recover a democratic balance between politics and the 
market.” Given the conditions of the late modern, globalized, multicultural world, 
Habermas is convinced that such a rebalancing between markets and peoples must occur 
beyond the nation-state. Following the transformations of 1989, he (Habermas, 1991b: 
41) argues that “the basic issue around which the argument today revolves” regards the 
“international formula into which the social democratic aims of the social curbing of capi-
talism [is] bound to be generalized.” Building on this insight, he concludes that the peo-
ples of Europe must further their “experiment with new forms of governance outside the 
nation-state” (Sissenich, 2008: 143) in order to confront international markets that have 
been able to dictate policy to sovereign states.
Concluding Remarks
By updating and reinterpreting Habermas’s thesis regarding the “colonization of the life-
world” by the systemic forces of power and money, I have sought to demonstrate the 
continuing relevance of his ideas to the relationship between markets and peoples. 
Drawing on his political writings on the future of Europe, I have also shown that his phi-
losophy has a clear practical and political intent, which is visible in his argument that 
politics must develop further at the supranational level if it is to reassert itself over and 
against the growing power of international markets to dictate domestic policy to formally 
sovereign states. By demonstrating the crucial role that Habermas’s interventions in the 
public sphere play in his broader philosophical and political project, I have also pushed 
back against “the peculiar imbalance on the side of theory that has characterized 
Habermas’s reception in English-speaking countries” (Pensky, 1995: 67–68).
Finally, I have argued that Habermas’s desire to assert control over markets by attack-
ing mainstream neo-liberal economics connects his project to Marx and justifies his 
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self-image of himself as a Marxist, if not “the last Marxist.” Just as Marx opposed the 
laissez-faire ideology of the classical economists and the physiocrats, who sought to pre-
serve the economic system as a sphere that operated through “quasi-natural” laws, so 
Habermas has argued against the ordo- and neo-liberal ideology that supports austerity as 
the proper response to the crisis of the Eurozone, despite its tragic effects on the lives of 
individuals throughout the EU. Despite Habermas’s critiques of Marx, these two theorists 
can therefore be brought together because they are both scholar-activists whose engage-
ment with the role of economics in social and political life seeks to make “the philoso-
pher’s influential relationship with his or her own times the centre, rather than the 
by-product, of the activity of philosophy itself” (Pensky, 2013: 15).
The issue of the relationship between markets and peoples, between economics and 
politics, and between the forces of the system and the power of the lifeworld, are crucial 
for understanding both Marx and Habermas. Interestingly, these issues remain just as sali-
ent at the start of the twenty-first century as they were in the mid-nineteenth century. 
Reflecting on the Great Recession 10 years after the fact, Henry Paulson, the US Secretary 
of the Treasury who helped to push through the government bailout of many major US 
financial institutions, noted, “When politics and the markets go head to head, the markets 
win” (quoted in Ryssdal, 2018). While this is true as a statement of fact in the present, it 
is normatively disquieting as it implies that the lifeworld of democratic politics cannot 
fight back against the systemic forces of late capitalism.
When Marx was writing in the nineteenth century, the dominant economic theories 
held that the operation of the market should be treated much like the operation of nature, 
that is, as something to be studied and understood, but interfered with or influenced. In 
the aftermath of Europe’s age of total war (1914–1945) and the total mobilization of soci-
ety necessary to fight these wars, state interference in the economy has been normalized 
to a surprising degree (Polanyi, 2001). This is a development that Marx would welcome, 
as today governments feel a little compunction about intervening to blunt steep economic 
downturns with fiscal stimulus.
However, despite these changes, this issue is still very much on the table. Although 
counter-cyclical Keynsian intervention in the market became standard operating proce-
dure during the postwar period, many conservative economists, including the ordo- and 
neo-liberals of the Freiburg and Bocconi Schools, have successfully pushed back against 
these ideas, arguing that fiscal stimulus was a moral hazard that promoted bad economic 
policies in the long run. The tragic consequences of these new laissez-faire ideologies has 
become visible over the course of the Great Recession and its aftermath, as international 
markets have been able to force states to implement austerity regimes despite the human 
suffering this caused.
The inability of individual states to stand up to the imperatives of these systemic forces 
testifies to the importance of continuing Marx’s fight against naturalized views of eco-
nomics, where humans serve the interests of the markets, not vice versa. Although he is 
often accused of not being radical enough, Habermas has continued Marx’s fight by argu-
ing that politics needs to catch up to global markets if the lifeworld is to have a chance to 
regulate and control these systemic forces. Writing immediately after the fall of commu-
nism in 1989, Habermas (1991b: 45) argues:
The challenges of the twenty-first century will be of an order and magnitude that demand 
answers . . . which cannot be arrived at, nor put into practice, without a radical-democratic 
universalization of interests through institutions for the formation of public opinion and political 
will. The socialist Left still has a place and a political role to play in this arena.
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I read Habermas’s reference to the “radical-democratic universalization of interests” 
as a call for postnational political solutions to the growing power of international market 
forces. If this plea was necessary in 1990, it is even more urgent in the wake of the Great 
Recession and the human suffering, the dominance of market forces brought about during 
this global economic crisis. Although it may still be true that markets win when they go 
head-to-head with politics, a revised and updated version of Habermas’s colonization 
thesis, supported by his political writings, provides a powerful argument for why this 
does not have to be—and why it also should not be—the case.
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Notes
1. Although the “power” of modern administration is also important, I set it aside due to constraints of space 
and as it is not central to this argument.
2. For more on Habermas’ relationship to Marxism, see, for example, Flood (1977: 448–464), Rockmore 
(1979, 1989: 195–206), Heller (1982), Jay (1984: 462–509), Anievas (2010), Holmwood (2009: 148–
151), and Yos (2019).
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